Abstract
Introduction
In the course of the 20th century, the methodological approach of German international legal scholarship changed from being philosophically inspired to being more practice oriented. As Martti Koskenniemi famously stressed, the German academic writing on international law of the period between 1871 and 1933 dealt with major philosophical issues. Georg Jellinek, Hans Kelsen and Erich Kaufmann seem to have been more inclined than their French and British colleagues to develop philosophically informed theories on the relationship between international law and state sovereignty. With the theory of auto-limitation, the pure theory of law and an analysis of international law's character (Wesen), Jellinek, Kelsen and Kaufmann reassessed the foundations of the discipline. 1 In contrast, during the Cold War, most West German scholars explored international law from a practical, doctrinal angle. They analysed the evolving state practice, evaluated the developing international treaty and institutional law and examined whether a specific act was legal or illegal. More interdisciplinary approaches, which addressed the historical, sociological or philosophical dimension of international law, were not as common. 2 In particular, at West Germany's leading research institution, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (MPI), a doctrinal approach to international law has dominated since its establishment in 1949.
3 While German international legal scholarship today is also known for its constitutionalist approach to international law, 4 the practice-oriented method has long been one of its defining characteristics. approaches of Viktor Bruns (1884 Bruns ( -1943 and Hermann Mosler (1912 Mosler ( -2001 . Even though other German international lawyers also subscribed to the practice-oriented approach during the 20th century, Bruns and Mosler seem to be the most prominent examples of this more general trend. Bruns was the first director of the newly founded Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (KWI) from 1924 to 1943. In the midst of the methodological dispute in German public law scholarship (Weimarer Methodenstreit), he introduced a practice-oriented approach to international law at the Institute. Soon, around 15 KWI researchers engaged with questions of international law and comparative public law from a legalistic perspective. 6 The often philosophically inspired German discipline, thus, somewhat shifted its focus to practice. After World War II, Mosler became director of the renamed MPI from 1954 to 1976. The 'spiritual father of today's German international law scholarship' shared Bruns' view that international lawyers should focus on strictly legal questions. 7 By the 1970s, between 25 to 30 academics studied international law at the Institute on the basis of this methodological perspective.
8 Through Mosler, the approach became the leading paradigm in German international legal scholarship. Because the well-funded MPI almost had a monopoly on training academically interested young international lawyers, the impact on succeeding generations was immense. Mosler supervised 10 post-doctoral researchers (Habilitanden), who later all became professors at West German universities and carried on his methodological leanings. 9 As has been stressed, for some time, it was 'almost impossible to meet no disciple of Hermann Mosler at [German] academic events on international law, European law or comparative public law '. 10 This article will lay out how the practice-oriented approach was institutionalized at the KWI in the 1920s in order to enhance international law as a legal system and to protect Germany's interests before the various newly founded international tribunals. During the National Socialist era, the Institute provided legal expertise to the increasingly radical anti-Versailles policy of the government. At the same time, some researchers at the Institute did not theorize about the advantages of a völkisch international law but, rather, urged the German military to comply with the ius in bello. After 1945, Hermann Mosler regarded the practice-oriented approach as the less discredited approach to international law and as the appropriate tool to support Konrad Adenauer's policies of integration into the West. Furthermore, he hoped that the systematization of international law would lead to a stronger international legal community.
International Law as a Legal Order, the Treaty of Versailles and the Founding of the KWI
During the 1920s, the methodological debate in German public law peaked. In the Weimarer Methodenstreit, the protagonist of the field debated emphatically about the best methodological take on public law research. 'Positivists', supporting a focus on legal rules, and 'anti-positivists', advocating a liberal arts-oriented (geisteswissenschaftliches) opening of legal formalism, opposed each other irreconcilably. 11 The debate influenced the discussions on international law. Despite devoting his own research to abstract, theoretical questions, 12 the Austrian Hans Kelsen called for a positivist focus on legal norms. 13 At the same time, Kelsen -together with the pacifists Hans Wehberg and Walther Schücking -dismissed the dominating sovereignty dogma, 14 arguing that states could be bound by international rules independent of their free will. 15 The more state-centric, conservative mainstream 16 responded by particularly criticizing Kelsen's exclusion of political arguments. Erich Kaufmann vehemently attacked Kelsen's Neokantian approach and suggested following a Hegelian natural law theory instead. 17 Furthermore, the father of dualism, Heinrich Triepel, explicitly demanded a 'connection of political considerations with the logical-formal working with terms (Begriffsarbeit)'. 18 More and more, German international lawyers emphasized the influence of political power relations on international law. Thereby, the legal quality of the detested Treaty of Versailles could be challenged. 19 At the same time, the practice-oriented approach in German international scholarship gained ground. International law came to be more relevant for the foreign relations of the German Reich. The Treaty of Versailles had established various mixed tribunals between the defeated and the victorious powers, which ruled on compensation claims for excessive measures of war and expropriation. Germany had such tribunals with Belgium, England, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, Siam and Czechoslovakia. 20 Moreover, the newly founded Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) decided various cases involving Germany. In one of its first decisions, the Court held that Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles obliged the German Reich to grant free passage through the Kiel Canal to a ship of a French charter company, which had war material on board (Wimbledon case). 21 In the advisory opinion on the Austro-German Customs Union of 1931, the PCIJ then classified the customs union agreement as a violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1922, in which Austria had pledged to uphold its economic independence (Custom Unions case). 22 The evolution of international law from the 'law of the books' (Buchrecht) to the law of practice created the need for legal experts. 23 German politicians and academics responded by strengthening academic institutions devoted to this practice. Eleven years after the American Society of International Law was created in 1906, the German Society of International Law was established in 1917. Its members now discussed legal issues like the status of the compensatory commissions of the Treaty of Versailles, the protection regime for national minorities, the relation of international to national courts and the legal significance of the Kellogg Pact. 24 Furthermore, at the Kiel Institute for International Law, the founder Theodor Niemeyer devoted some of his research to legal questions of the law of the sea, while his successor Schücking, together with Wehberg, published the famous commentary on the Covenant of the League of Nations. 25 Moreover, with the financial support of the German Reich, the KWI was established in 1924-1925 in the City Palace, Berlin, and became the most important institution dedicated to the practiceoriented method.
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Its first director, Viktor Bruns (born in 1884), came from an academic bourgeois family. 27 In the first part of his career, he focused on civil law. 28 After working as a legal advisor to the German army during World War I, 29 Bruns taught civil and Roman law as associate professor (Extraordinarius) in Geneva (1910) (1911) (1912) and in Berlin (1912 Berlin ( -1920 . 30 major treaties, but not systematize the general legal characteristics of international treaties. 35 In contrast, Bruns advocated to perceive international law as a legal system in which legal principles are arranged with each other. 36 He stressed that this legal system would limit the freedom of states. Instead of emphasizing the independence of states as a fundamental principle of international law -like the PCIJ had done in its East Carelia decision 37 -Bruns underlined that constraints of the individual actors for the better of the community form the basis of each legal order. 38 On the other hand, despite his critique of positivism, 39 Bruns stressed the relevance of a meticulous analysis of state practice. According to him, the 'most important task of a science' is to prepare 'the work of the courts' and to demonstrate 'the systematic relationships of a cohesive legal system'. He criticized positivism for 'not realizing its own program' because the practice of states has 'rarely been explored seriously'. In particular, the jurisprudence of international courts has 'not yet been assessed by theory according to its importance'. 40 Hence, while rejecting voluntarist-positivist theories that stress the free will of states, Bruns embraced a research focus on international practice.
Bruns thus tried to advance his community-oriented vision of international law by collecting and assessing international practice. He described the task of the KWI as being 'to research through the international legal source material, which is equally important for theory and for practice, according to a uniform plan and system and make the entire legal and political general principles, individual rules and individual decisions, which are contained in this material, available for general use in systematically organized form'. 41 A memorandum of 1925 on the founding of the Institute stated:
An institution is completely missing, … which due to systematic collection and processing of domestic and foreign material is able to rapidly provide information on legal matters relating to international law and foreign public law. ... Who in practice or in theory deals with questions of international and foreign law, knows, that in this field the individual ... researcher no longer is able to gain an overview of only the most important documents. In thousands of treaties, thousands of judgments of national or international courts, in a vast amount of government statements, parliamentary proceedings, this material is dispersed. Here can only help an organization working with exact methods that gathers the immense material of the most important civilized countries (Kulturländer) and processes it. 42 In this spirit, the research project Fontes Iuris Gentium produced trilingual handbooks in German, French and English, which systematized the decisions of the PCIJ , the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) If a greater degree of objectivity is to be gained for research and practice in international law, it is necessary that first of all vast, difficult and unselfish preliminary work should be done: the enormous bulk of material must be collected, sifted and systematically arranged, in order that every student of questions of international law should be placed in a position enabling him to make a rapid survey of the documents relating to the particular subject of his study.
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For Bruns, a rigorous assessment of the practice of courts and states was the starting point of international legal research.
The translation of the Fontes in foreign languages demonstrates that Bruns intended to advance his understanding of international law as a legal order through exchange with colleagues from abroad. In a memorandum from 1929, Bruns stressed that members of the PCIJ and some American colleagues had welcomed the idea to collect general rules of international law by analysing PCIJ decisions. According to Bruns, colleagues from Harvard even urged him to publish an English version of the compilation. 44 Furthermore, the KWI supported international debate and exchange in other areas. For instance, Bruns commissioned a German translation of Dionisio Anzilotti's Corso di diritto internazionale (1915), which he regarded as the best book on international law. 45 Shortly after its founding, the KWI also started to collaborate with Harvard, the London School of Economics and the Japanese Institute of International Law in Tokyo. According to the annual reports of the KWI, members of Yale University, Harvard University and a Swedish professor were inclined to set up similar institutes dedicated to the research on international law. The Yale professor Edwin Borchard celebrated the founding of the KWI as 'an epoch-making event in the development of the science of international law'. For him, the KWI had 'no comparable rival'. Borchard hoped that soon 'similar research institutes in other nations' would cooperate with the KWI. 46 Moreover, scholars like the Argentinian Juan Carlos Garay, the American James Brown Scott and the Latvian Max M. Laserson held presentations at the KWI, while younger scholars from the USA, Switzerland and Bulgaria were researching in Berlin for some time. 47 Bruns as director of the KWI was thus aware of the importance of international exchange for the proliferation of his research objectives. The international engagement also had some influence on the practice-oriented approach. In the memorandum on the founding of the KWI, Bruns stressed that in the USA, Britain and France 43 engagement with practical question had been missing in the German discipline. According to him, the German international legal discipline had turned to practice with the founding of the KWI in order to close the gap with the international standard. 49 In his explanation of the founding of the Institute, the practice-oriented approach thus migrated from the USA and Britain to Germany.
However, it would be wrong to assume that the institutionalization of the practiceoriented approach to international law at the Institute was motivated only by the interest of promoting international law as a legal system or by trying to achieve the standard of international legal scholarship of other Western countries. In the political and social context of the time, the legal expertise gathered at the KWI was regarded as an important factor in Germany's approach to the Treaty of Versailles. Germany's international lawyers were united in their opposition to the Treaty. For Heinrich Triepel, the clause prohibiting the reunification of Germany and Austria constituted an 'unnatural separation' that a 'great nation' could not tolerate permanently. 50 According to Erich Kaufmann, it was 'madness' to base a peace treaty on 'punitive justice'. 51 Not only national conservative thinkers, but also many pacifists, rejected Versailles. For Schücking, the Treaty resembled an 'egregious injustice' triggering a 'right to revision'. 52 Similarly, Wehberg described the revision of the Treaty as 'a precondition for the reconstruction of Europe'. The KWI went along in defending German interests in the context of the Treaty. The members of the Institute not only provided legal expertise to the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) and to German counsels appearing before the newly established tribunals and courts. Also, the research at the Institute was supposed to strengthen the overall German legal position in relation to the foreign powers. The memorandum of 1925 held: 'The location of Germany demands a deepening of the knowledge of foreign legal concepts and positions. ... On a foreign arbitrator or on an adversary in negotiations, especially those arguments will make an impression, which stem from his conceptual world.' It went on:
How important a systematic observation of foreign scientific statements is, knows everyone, who is aware of the meticulously organized propaganda of our neighbors in the West and East. They understand, long before a legal issue leads to diplomatic negotiations or is presented to an international court for decision, to influence the academic opinion in their favor. 54 Hence, the KWI was supposed to influence and alter the international legal discourse from a German perspective. The memorandum of 1929 underlined:
The work can and must be carried out as a German scientific enterprise without any assistance and influence of foreign countries. It is the task of German science because today the theoretical systematic training of German lawyers is still superior to that of foreigners. The work has to be carried out as German, because ... it will constitute an indispensable tool not only of every scientific, but also of every practical activity and the ... impact on the internationally evolving law and justice notions will be a goal, which cannot possibly be overestimated in its importance. 55 Accordingly, a bulletin of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society described 'the fostering and development of a German international legal theory' as one of the Institute's main tasks. 56 In the context of Versailles, the Institute was supposed to invigorate the German position.
Between Support of National Socialist Foreign Policy and Defending the Ius in Bello
After the National Socialist takeover, international legal scholarship in Germany changed significantly. The new leadership drove numerous international lawyers of Jewish origin and pacifist convictions into exile. Kelsen was dismissed from his chair in Cologne and fled via Geneva and Prague to the USA. 57 Schücking, who was a judge at the PCIJ, decided not to return from The Hague to Germany and was stripped of his position at the University of Kiel before he died in 1935. 58 In addition, the national 60 Formalist approaches to international law, which had come under pressure before, started to be questioned from even more sides. Carl Schmitt lambasted against the 'positivist-normativistic forcing norm network (Zwangsnormengeflecht) of Versailles' and polemicized that behind the 'thin veneer of juridical legalizations' the 'grimace of a menial and cruel kind of rape and suppression' was hidden. 61 In
[The] exceedingly successful foreign policy of the Führer [has] led German international legal scholarship to the recognition of its task as reality-based and present-responsible political science (wirklichkeitsverbundener und gegenwartsverantwortlicher politischer Wissenschaft). Instead of dead formulas and abstract terms, the politics of international law come to the fore as the academic observation of the concrete political international law, as the treatment of international law under the dynamic aspect of transformation, the struggle of new ideas with old formulas. It has not only the task of finding and unmasking the political, historical and ideological backgrounds of the Western European and Anglo-Saxon international law, to supply German foreign policy in its struggle for freedom and greatness of the German people with weapons in international law and to find new forms, new vessels for new policy ideas and creations; it has above all to work out the system of a real international legal order (Völkerrechtsordnung) that no longer is a summation of more or less random formal rules. 63 Soon a geopolitical and racist vision for the reconstruction of Europe started to compete in German international legal scholarship. In the context of the powers had to tolerate German expansion in Europe because it belonged to the German sphere of influence. 65 At the same time, völkisch authors relied on racial criteria for the classification of the world. Reinhard Höhn, member of the Schutzstaffel, stressed that the 'empire of the People Community' (Reich der Volksgemeinschaft) formed the 'living heart of the European Great Space (living space)'. He postulated that the 'völkisch organizing principle' should be extended to foreign policy. 66 Werner Best, a leading figure of the Gestapo, even denied that international law existed at all. A völkisch order, which did not know any law at all, would have the advantage of not 'preserv[ing] artificially' the status quo. 67 Due to the political and military strength of Germany, these lawyers regarded traditional international law as an outmoded relic of the pre-war period.
With the exception of these geopolitically and ideologically informed theories, formalist, practice-oriented international law did not lose its relevance under National Socialism. 68 In particular, the KWI supported the National Socialist foreign policy with legal expertise on the basis of a formal understanding of international law. In 1933, the National Socialist politician Hans Frank appointed Bruns as an expert in international law to the Academy of German Law. 69 In his scholarship, Bruns now vehemently criticized the Treaty of Versailles as a violation of Germany's equality. 70 Also, he justified the introduction of compulsory military service in March 1935, even though it could hardly be brought in line with the provisions of the Treaty. 71 Furthermore, after the Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938, he stressed that the 'question of the ultimate fate of the Sudeten Germans ... is decided in the sense of the indisputable German right'. 72 During World War II, members of the KWI then criticized the Allied war opponents. An anonymous article in the ZaöRV sharply attacked Britain's political reasons for going to war and emphasized the need to counter England with 'a constructive plan for Europe'. 73 Moreover, Bruns repeatedly stressed that the British naval blockade violated the rules of neutrality. 74 When, from 1944 to 1945, Carl Bilfinger became the successor to Bruns, the Institute moved even further to the nationalist right. 75 This might explain why an observer later dismissively spoke of the 'nazified Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht'. 76 However, support for the National Socialist policy objectives had its limits. The KWI could partially escape from völkisch politicization. The anti-Semitic program of the National Socialists did not receive a great deal of attention in the Institute's scholarship, and many members tried to establish a relative distance from the party. Neither Bruns, nor his deputy Ernst Martin Schmitz, had applied for membership in the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, and only one of the six department heads joined the party. 77 Also, Joachim-Dieter Bloch, who according to National Socialist understanding was a 'quarter Jew', was able to keep his research position at the Institute during the National Socialist era. 78 Moreover, the publications of the Institute mostly addressed specific doctrinal problems and did not engage with völkisch theory. The articles in the ZaöRV often concerned questions like the development of the League of Nations, 79 legal perspectives on political incidents 80 and the evolution of the laws of war. 81 While most of the time the writers defended and legitimized the German legal position, 82 völkisch-inspired claims on collective minority rights 83 87 In addition, during World War II, some members of the KWI were not willing to compromise the laws of war. This was not the typical German position. International lawyers from outside the Institute suggested that it should consider the applicability of the Hague Conventions in Poland only because this argument played a role in foreign literature. 88 Also, it was argued that some of the laws of war should not apply to the Soviet Union as the ravager of 'all international legal order'. 89 In contrast, some members of the Institute embraced the applicable ius in bello. Ernst Martin Schmitz explicitly stressed in the Academy of German Law that the restructuring of Poland in the so-called Gaue violated the Hague Conventions. 90 Bruns, Schmitz, Mosler and Berthold Graf von Stauffenberg drafted the German Prize Ordinance (Deutsche Prisenordnung), the Prize Court Order (Prisengerichtsordnung) as well as parts of a regulation on aerial warfare (Luftkriegsordnung) and thereby incorporated the applicable ius in bello rules concerning sea and aerial warfare into German law. 91 Furthermore, they supported Helmut James Graf von Moltke, the legal advisor of the Wehrmacht and founder of the oppositional Kreisauer Kreis, with legal expertise in his efforts to convince the military to observe the ius in bello obligations. For instance, when the question arose how prisoners of war should be treated, who had been released and later retained again, the legal experts advocated to grant the protection of the Hague Conventions. 92 Despite their strong support for the National Socialist revisionist policies of the Treaty of Versailles, some members hoped for the systematic application of the ius in bello in wartime.
The Practice-Oriented Approach in West Germany after 1945
After 1945, the practice-oriented approach started to become dominant in German international legal scholarship. The re-established German Society of International Law focused mainly on issues directly linked to pertinent practical questions like the legal status of Germany, the legal structure of international organizations and the relation between the Grundgesetz and international law. 93 Also, newly created German international law journals like the Archiv für Völkerrecht and the Jahrbuch für internationales und ausländisches öffentliches Recht examined international legal questions from a doctrinal perspective. 94 Moreover, the heads of the influential Kiel and Göttingen Institutes for International Law, Eberhard Menzel and Georg Erler, subscribed to the practice-oriented approach. 95 Furthermore, the renamed Max Planck Institute continued the application-oriented method of the KWI. Hermann Mosler, born in 1912, personified the link between the old KWI tradition and the German research focus after 1945 like no one else. A research assistant at the KWI since 1937, he had been strongly influenced by the thinking of Bruns and Schmitz. 96 Mosler stemmed from a Catholic bourgeois family. His father had supported the Catholic Zentrum party and had been pushed to leave his position as chief justice of the Regional Court in Bonn after the National Socialist takeover. 97 Because of this background, Mosler did not share the nationalist völkisch enthusiasm of most of his classmates at university. 98 Nonetheless, as a student, he joined the Sturmabteilung (SA) for four months (December 1933 to April 1934) and later became a member of the National Socialist Association of German Legal Professionals (NS-Rechtswahrerbund). 99 In his dissertation, however, he embraced the idea of an objective international legal order based on natural law and expressed his hope that Hitler in his 'Peace Talks' had committed himself to international law and the non-intervention principle.
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After 1945, Mosler quickly became one of the most influential and most respected West German international lawyers. Besides heading the MPI for more than 20 years (1954-1976) , he sat as the first German judge at the European Court of Human Rights and became the first German judge at the International Court of Justice (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) approach to legal scholarship. First, to him, practice-oriented international legal scholarship seemed to be less discredited than the ideologized völkisch theory of international law. Second, his experience as a legal advisor to Konrad Adenauer strengthened his belief that the practice-oriented approach could contribute to the 'normalization' of Germany's international relations after 1945. Third, he regarded practice-oriented research as a promising avenue that would lead towards a legal community at the international level.
A Turning Away from Theoretical Völkisch International Law
For Mosler, the different degrees of rapprochement to the racial ideology of the National Socialists had methodological implications for the post-war period. In his view, the line between discredited and not-discredited colleagues ran along different methodological preferences. This became particularly evident during a lecture that Mosler held in 1966 in Heidelberg on the topic of constitutional law during the National Socialist era. 101 The newspaper article, written by a journalist present at the lecture, will be cited here in part:
By accumulation of citations, [Hermann Mosler] explained to his Auditorium, how legal scholars of rank applauded to the new political order, and with their constitutional constructions tried to understand, justify and support the Nazi regime. As a preliminary point, Mosler used the writings of Carl Schmitt, E. Forsthoff, E. R. Huber and O. Koellreutter to show how the conventional constitutional terms were liquidated and perverted as to put a constitutional law cloak on the total leader state (totalen Führerstaat). … The new legal thinking brought an end to the traditional concept of legislation, which gains its content from rule of law principles and functions as a guarantor against the abuse of power. As to sweep away this 'ghost world of general ideas' all legal opinions were fought, which are based on predictable, predetermined standards and constitute a part of justice thinking of Roman provenance. 'Concrete order thinking' was the slogan, that took away the opportunity to attain standards from regulating norms. 'Concrete' became a meaningless, non-binding magic formula to destroy the material determinate legislation, the expression of objective ratio. In its place stepped the plan and will of the 'Führer', which united law and legislature and whose acts created legally binding legal propositions. ... Degeneration of the scientific and legal method (Entartung der wissenschaftlichjuristischen Methode) 102 and ignorance of the facts of the Third Reich characterize the … theory of leadership, which sank into barbarism and came off in an apocalyptic finale. 103 This depiction of National Socialist constitutional law demonstrates that Mosler regarded the opening for new theoretical concepts as a unifying element of the discredited legal scholarship. In his view, scholars affiliated with National Socialism had left the formal legal research agenda behind and had reinterpreted law in the interest of the National Socialist ideology. From this interpretation of the past, Mosler concluded that a formalist practice-oriented approach was the right one. In his view, because of its orientation towards practice, the KWI had not given in to National Socialist pressure in the same way as other institutions. 104 Of course, this was only part of the truth. Mosler's remarks also had an apologetic function. As we have seen, the KWI was involved in the legal justification of the foreign policy of the National Socialist government, at least insofar as that mirrored national conservative positions. 105 Furthermore, outside of the KWI, the formalist legal method had been used to systematize and comment upon some of the most racist National Socialist laws. Notoriously, even the Nuremberg laws were accompanied by legal formalist commentary. 106 However, Mosler had a fair point when he underlined that between 1933 and 1945 many German scholars had started to redefine formal law concepts. By coining new terms on the basis of the völkisch ideology, it was particularly easy to demonstrate the support for the new regime. 107 For instance, Carl Schmitt renounced 'normativism' and 'legal positivism' and demanded a 'new type of jurisprudential thinking', which he called 'concrete order thinking'. He argued that only this thinking was 'up to the number of new challenges of the public, ethnic, economic and ideological situation and the new forms of community' and could do justice to 'the nascent communities, orders and designs of a new century'. 108 Furthermore, international lawyers like Ernst Wolgast, Norbert Gürke, Gustav Adolf Walz and Reinhard Höhn overwrote old legal concepts with the new ideologized terminology of Volk and Reich. 109 Moreover, Mosler was not the only one who after 1945 regarded the practice-oriented approach as a counter model to National Socialist approaches. It is striking that some of the international lawyers, who had embraced the National Socialist ideology during the 1930s, turned to practice after 1945. Eberhard Menzel was said to be a pragmatist and practice-oriented lawyer, 110 even though in the 1930s he had proposed to rethink international law in light of the National Socialist agenda. 111 Also, Georg Erler described the 'pedestrian-sober research on text and reality of the applicable international law' as 'the appropriate and well-understood task' of the KWI's work, 112 while, in the 1930s, he had detected the (alleged) political influence of 'big business, Judaism and Masonry (Großkapital, Judentum und Freimaurerei)' on Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy. 113 It is thus telling that the international lawyer Fritz Münch in 1956 praised the practice-oriented approach of a colleague for the 'more intuitive than theoretical-sophisticated reasoning of his propositions'. Münch stressed: 'Certainly we today have a sense that a too theoretical treatment of the law, also of its very foundations, very easily leads astray.' 114 By concentrating on practice, German international lawyers found a common research language, which focused on the here and now and kept the enmeshments and burdens of the past at bay.
B In Support of Konrad Adenauer's integration into the West
One further reason why the practice-oriented approach took hold in Germany after 1945 was because of its value for German foreign policy. By assisting the government with legal expertise, international lawyers contributed to leading West Germany back onto the Western path on the basis of Konrad Adenauer's policy of Westintegration. The involvement of Mosler in this policy is particularly telling. In 1950, he became part of the German delegation headed by Walter Hallstein, which represented West Germany in the negotiations on the Treaty of the European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS) in Paris. 115 As a member of the legal committee, Mosler pre-discussed the composition and function of the various organs with lawyers from Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Italy. 116 After returning to Germany, he became head of the legal department of the re-established Auswärtige Amt from 1951 to 1953. In this function, Mosler contributed to formulating the German position on the General Treaty, which reduced the restrictions on West Germany's sovereignty. 117 Also, he was involved in the domestic controversy about the European Defence Community, which provided for an integrated European army.
Mosler tried to benefit from his experience as a legal advisor in his academic research. It was natural for him to 'evaluate the participation [at the Schuman plan conference] in his scholarship'. 119 Shortly after the organizational structure of the ECCS had been laid out in Paris, Mosler commented on its juridical quality. He argued that the 'fusion of sovereignty rights' and the 'supranational structure' distinguished the Schuman plan from conventional associations between states like the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN). While the obligations of the parties could still be assessed according to international law, the Community had a constitutional structure. 120 Hence, there was a strong link between Mosler's work as a practitioner and his scholarship. He underlined that the practical experience at the negotiations in Paris 'infinitely enriched' his academic work because he had seen 'from the inside, how the government of a modern state works and how legal thinking and practice of international law are mutually dependent on each other'. 121 In the years to come, Mosler concentrated on the legal character of the new European law, 122 the interpretation of the Basic Law 123 and the analysis of the legal potential of international organizations 124 as well as of international courts. 125 Instead of examining theoretical aspects of legal questions, he utilized the practice-oriented method in order to accompany European integration and consolidate West Germany as a partner of the West.
Mosler was not the only German international lawyer after 1945 who took this route. Various scholars stressed the relevance of international law for West Germany. As Ulrich Scheuner remarked during a meeting of the German Society of International Law in the mid-1950s, ' [e]ven though Germany has moved geographically and politically to the edge of the sphere of life of the free world, ... because of its volatile situation and the unsolved problems of its existence, it depends even more on the weight of law in the relations of nations'. 126 Similarly, Wilhelm Grewe argued in retrospect: 'New problems arose [after 1945 ] that compelled to return to the realm of the applicable constitutional and international law: the field of international law had to answer questions which the quadripartite occupation, the war criminal trials, the special position of Berlin, the division of Germany, the creation of NATO and the European integration, the rearmament and the Non-Proliferation Treaty had raised.' 127 At the same time, the practical approach contained a conscious, political programme. By limiting oneself to strictly legal argumentation, one tried to regain the trust of the (Western) world. At the meeting of the German Society of International Law in 1952, Mosler argued that the German science of international law:
should be reserved enough not to transcend the limits drawn by the jurisprudential task. The weight of the voices, speaking at this conference, will be the heavier, the more the temptation is resisted, to encroach on economic and political problems, ... on which other bodies are more knowledgeable or where desires and fears mix with scientific arguments. 128 Thereby, Mosler asked his German colleagues to approach international law from a legal perspective. For him, this was the avenue to enhance international exchange, especially when approaching foreign scholars. Accordingly, he opened the MPI for international discussions on legal questions with increasing success. While, during the 1950s, the West German discipline was often preoccupied with its own problems (war criminal tribunals, the legal status of Germany, international law and the Basic Law), this soon started to change. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mosler invited foreign colleagues to various colloquia on topics like human rights protection in Europe. 129 Already in 1961-1962, researchers from Korea, the USA, Japan, Spain, Australia and Canada were listed as 'foreign employees' of the Institute. 130 By 1975, 40 scholars from 18 countries, not only from Europe and the USA but also from India, Taiwan and Brazil, had spent some time at the MPI, 131 while the number rose to 61 researchers from 27 countries by the end of the Cold War. 132 In retrospect, Mosler described 'the recovery of a position in international exchange' as the 'main goal' in the postwar period. The approach of Bruns was 'the academic and pragmatic program which seemed right at that time'. In his view, the resumption of the KWI method had been very helpful in fighting the 'heavy burden of international isolation'. 133 For Mosler, the practice-oriented method paved the way for the Federal Republic to become an equal international partner of the West. international community, while it is certainly a rudimentary one, cannot be restricted to mere formal principles, and dispense with any substantive principles of coexistence and co-operation within the society of States.' 141 These would have a special status in the hierarchy of norms: 'Constitutional principles containing substantive law are of a higher character because it is essential that all other rules must not infringe upon them.' 142 Mosler called these principles the common public order:
The public order of the international community … consists of principles and rules the enforcement of which is of such vital importance to the international community as a whole that any unilateral action or any agreement which contravenes these principles can have no legal force. The reason for this follows simply from logic: the law cannot recognize any act either of one member or of several members in concert, as being legally valid, if it is directed against the very foundation of law.
According to Mosler, the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the aggressor and the non-derogable 'basic rules' of the European Convention on Human Rights were examples of such rules. 143 This reading of international law was strongly influenced by the development of international practice. At the 1968-1969 UN conference on the law of treaties, state officials of various countries had agreed to include the notion of ius cogens into the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 144 Article 53 held that a 'treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law'. It defined a peremptory norm as a norm 'accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole' and 'from which no derogation is permitted'. Mosler had closely watched this development. For him, ius cogens was an expression of the international public order. 145 In his Hague lecture, he then referred to Article 53 of the VCLT as evidence for substantive fundamental principles. 146 Mosler thus based his understanding of the international society as a legal community governed by constitutional elements on an analysis of the current legal developments. Even though he was well aware that during the Cold War the development of international law depended on the common interests of the American and Soviet superpowers, 147 he arranged the existing international legal norms into a sophisticated legal system. Thereby, Mosler came to be a Cold War precursor of the constitutionalization approach in international law. 148 But in contrast to recent programmatic visions of constitutionalization, 149 he understood his reading as descriptive and reflective of the international legal practice. In his vision of international law, international practice and the international legal community were closely linked with each other.
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that the institutionalization of the practice-oriented approach at the KWI and MPI was one very important reason for its far-reaching impact in German international legal scholarship. The Institutes had the financial and intellectual capacities to influence international legal scholarship at universities across Germany. Furthermore, because of the close relationship to German foreign policy practice, the KWI and MPI supported the different agendas of different governments over the course of the 20th century. During the Weimar period, the KWI assisted the government before the new international tribunals with legal expertise in the context of the Treaty of Versailles. Between 1933 and 1945, it legitimized some of the radical National Socialist anti-Versailles policies. After 1945, lawyers at the MPI then contributed to Germany's integration into the West by providing legal expertise to the Adenauer government. At the same time, since the founding of the KWI, members at the Institute have regarded the practice-oriented approach as a tool for systematizing and strengthening the idea of the rule of law at the international level. Bruns understood international law as an international legal order that had to be systematically analysed by legal researchers. During World War II, some lawyers at the KWI then tried to uphold the ius in bello even in times of 'total war'. In the 1970s, Mosler recognized constitutional elements in the international legal community based on an assessment of the development of international practice since the end of the World War II.
What does this story tell us about (German) international legal scholarship today? Does the experience of völkisch theorization during the National Socialist period discredit theoretical approaches per se? Or, on the contrary, is the practice-oriented approach linked so closely to the respective foreign policy that it does not allow for independent scholarship? First, it should be stressed that even though German legal scholarship still comes with its particular approach, 150 German international legal research has somewhat changed in the past 20 years. For instance, at the Max Planck Institute, Armin von Bogdandy now assesses the legitimacy of international institutions and courts via the scheme of international public authority, 151 while Anne
